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Reviewed by
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The leitmotiv of Goering's defense at the Nuremberg trials returned time and time again to this theme:
“The victor will always be the judge, and the vanquished will always be the accused.”
-Albert Camus, The Rebel
That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and
voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes
that Power has ever paid to reason.
-Justice Robert H. Jackson

Introduction
Justice Robert H. Jackson's opening statement at the Nuremberg trial has justly been
characterized as one of the greatest orations in modern juristic literature. Yet behind its
rhetorical power lies a fervent anxiety: a desire to silence the skeptical voices whispering
that the Nuremberg trials were just the tarted-up revenge to which Camus alludes.
Nuremberg was indeed the profoundest tribute of power to reason, as Jackson claimed,
but of what did the tribute consist? Jackson said it was to “stay the hand of vengeance,”
so to turn vengeance into something else in the instant before the hand falls. Vengeance,
therefore, becomes justice by virtue of a pause: a pause in which the partial becomes
impartial. The action that had seemed inevitable becomes *282 suddenly, for a moment,
contingent. A pause, a moment, a space of time, a gap in the historical action: this was
the tribute that constituted Nuremberg. It resolves the skeptical anxiety that the trial was
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only about vengeance.
Telford Taylor's splendid memoir of the Nuremberg trial examines this pause. More
precisely, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials is an examination of the interior of that
pause, its inner architecture. Taylor was a chief deputy prosecutor in the American team
led by Jackson, and the chief American prosecutor in subsequent trials of war criminals
also held at Nuremberg. Drawing on this experience, Taylor presents four major,
interwoven themes: a discussion of the laws of war that is both accessible to the nonlawyer and interesting to the specialist; an account of the trial itself from the standpoint
of a participant appreciative of its human drama and legal complexity; a private
assessment of the legacy of Nuremberg; and, most important, a detailed portrait of how
the war-crimes community lived and interacted in Nuremberg during the years 19451946.
This is not to say that other works on Nuremberg have concentrated exclusively on the
trial or the defendants, or that they have not looked into the lives of the key players at the
trial. However, insofar as the other accounts have examined the people who participated
at Nuremberg, they have examined personality-that is, individuals-and have sought to
assess their contributions to history. Taylor, by contrast, succeeds in re-creating the larger
community that staged the trial: the people and their daily interactions. This task is easier
for him, having been in Nuremberg throughout the trials, than for some other
commentators. He portrays the Nuremberg community in the goings-on of minor players:
clerks and translators and motor pool drivers doing their jobs, the second-tier lawyers, the
staff counsel, and the Great and Good, who were, in their own estimation, Making
History. In effect, Taylor recreates the sensibility of Nuremberg-by which I mean he
recreates the tone, emotions, and emotional perceptions of the trial.
Working with admirable energy in his mid-eighties, Taylor has written a true memoir. It
is neither an historian's magisterial summation of Nuremberg, a Theory of Everything,
nor a Ph.D. dissertation by a breathless young scholar looking to make a splash. Both
seek to exaggerate, often correctly but sometimes not, their subject matter. In contrast,
The Anatomy is the work of a man looking back across the distance of a long life, with
modesty, probity, and spare humor, his judgment seasoned but undimmed by the passing
decades. He seeks neither to exaggerate nor to diminish, but to memorialize what
happened, and what it was like and felt like. No matter how well-informed on law,
history, and politics, and no matter how authoritative the scholarship, The Anatomy is
still a memoir. Taylor understands instinctively*283 that to be readable, a memoir must
be modest. The Anatomy displays modesty, sympathy, and engagement in abundance.
One might appreciate Taylor's perspective but consider it inconsequential, merely a
matter of human interest. One might believe that this is the stuff of magazine stories, not
of deep analysis. But I think this is wrong. The Anatomy is timely and uniquely
important because the sensibility of the war crimes tribunal is once again at issue-this
time, in the matter of the international tribunal established by the Security Council to try
war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. As of this writing, the Yugoslavia tribunal appears
to be in deep logistical trouble, lacking defendants, a serious prosecutor, court-defensible
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evidence, investigatory resources, cooperation, and political will. [FN1] I shall argue that
these failures arise not just from incompetence or even from lack of political willpracticalities-but also because the promoters of Yugoslavia's tribunal have misunderstood
the sensibility of Nuremberg while attempting to duplicate Nuremberg's legal forms.

I.
I first discovered The Anatomy in the form of bound galleys, given to me by Aryeh
Neier, then Executive Director of the New York-based Human Rights Watch. He thrust
them into my hands shortly before I was to depart for Iraqi Kurdistan, via Turkey, in the
spring of 1992. I tried to muster some enthusiasm, but in truth, they weighed a lot, and I
already had one large nonfiction tome to read during this several months-long mission to
a place without mail, telephone, fax, and, frequently, electricity.
I was mission leader of a team of scientists going to Iraqi Kurdistan, under the
sponsorship of Human Rights Watch and the Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights,
to unearth mass graves of Kurds killed by Saddam Hussein in the infamous Anfal
campaign of 1988. The scientists were anthropologists and archaeologists experienced in
forensic work-determining causes and manners of death from physical evidence, such as
skeletons and artifacts. They were a highly skilled group from around the world. They
had previously excavated the skeletal remains of victims of the “dirty war” in Argentina,
and later had worked in Chile, the Philippines, Guatemala, and El Salvador.
In the end, I took the galleys with me. It was at once appropriate and strange to read them
by night in the village of Koreme, in the hills beneath the great mountains that marked
the Turkish border. By day, we were slowly, painstakingly unearthing the remains of
twenty-*284 six of Koreme's men and boys, who lay in two pits at the edge of the village.
[FN2]
Koreme, like so many other Kurdish villages, had been systematically demolished by
special Iraqi Army teams. Its houses had been bulldozed and its school and mosque
dynamited; most of the village men had been executed and the remainder sent south,
never to be seen again. The women, children, and old men had been dumped into camps
without any real provision of food or water, where they died by the thousands from
hunger and exposure. The physical destruction of Koreme, however, did not take place in
the course of battle: it was razed after it had been emptied of its inhabitants-to wipe out
the fact that anyone had lived there at all.
The village well was poured over with cement; even the rubble of the school, which the
implosive charges of the demolition teams had laid out in neat, straight lines, was booby
trapped with mines. The team archaeologist had to watch for trip wires as he mapped out
the remains of Koreme. Still, nature had its own way of preserving the traces of life. In
springtime, in the well-watered mountain valleys of Kurdistan, we found irregular glades
of wildflowers, especially Queen Anne's lace, which grows in disturbed earth marking
the places where the villages stood.
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The systematic destruction of Koreme inevitably brought to mind the destruction of the
village of Lidice in World War II, one of the “crimes against humanity” presented at
Nuremberg. Indeed, I could find scarcely any difference between Albert Camus' epitaph
for Lidice and the circumstances of organized ruin in Koreme:
Until [Lidice], there were supposedly only two possible attitudes for a
conqueror toward a village that was considered rebellious. Either
calculated repression and the cold-blooded execution of hostages, or a
savage and necessarily brief sack by enraged soldiers. Lidice was
destroyed by both methods simultaneously.... Not only were all the houses
burned to the ground, the hundred and seventy-four men of the village
shot, the two hundred and three women deported, and the three hundred
children transferred elsewhere to be educated in the religion of the Fuhrer,
but special teams spent months at work leveling the terrain with dynamite,
destroying the very stones, filling in the village pond, and finally diverting
the course of the river. After that, Lidice was really nothing more than a
mere possibility.... To make assurance doubly *285 sure, the cemetery was
emptied of its dead, who might have been a perpetual reminder that once
something existed in this place. [FN3]
Our team in Kurdistan was investigating the same crime that preoccupied Nuremberg:
genocide. [FN4] We plotted graphs to identify where shell casings had fallen from the
firing squad, and took soil samples from a neighboring village to show that it had been
bombarded, as the villagers said, with chemical weapons. In making this collection of
physical evidence, we sought to establish incontrovertible proof, forensic evidence that
would be admissible in a real court of law.
Because I am a lawyer and not a scientist, my task as a member of the team was to advise
the investigators of the legal rules of evidence and to interview village survivors. In this
role, I watched with considerable respect as the team's anthropologists and archaeologists
unearthed the four year-old mass graves, centimeter by centimeter, with the same
technique and care that they would spend on a 2000 year-old village. I watched with
equal respect and fascination as the anthropologists took the commingled bones and,
laying them out in the morgue of the closest town hospital, painstakingly reassembled the
twenty-six skeletons to give an astonishingly detailed account of the manner of death.
Over the course of these months in the field, I became aware of a parallel between what I
was watching unfold around me at Koreme and what I was reading at night in Taylor's
book. The work of the scientists was exacting and technical, and required great care and
skill. They excavated with paintbrushes and toothbrushes; in the morgue, they used
specialized reference works and complicated tests. The shell casings were collected and
plotted; an expert in the United States would examine them through a microscope, one at
a time, to identify the hammer mechanisms of the individual rifles. It was hard work,
requiring patience and concentration, often under a hot sun. Often it was tedious, detailoriented, and technical. Discussions were about the angles at which bullets had entered
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skeletal structures and the patterns of bone fracture. It was not dramatic. It was not
glamorous.
*286 II.
The practice of law, and especially the preparation of a criminal trial, is also rarely
glamorous or dramatic. This is a homely truth, but it is also a truth about the Nuremberg
trial.
I recognized this truth in the course of reading The Anatomy night after night in
Kurdistan: tedium is a constant in Taylor's frank evocation of Nuremberg. I do not mean
by “tedium” that the work was unimportant or lacked the technician's interest in legal
process-the minutiae that we lawyers regard as craftmanship. On the contrary,
Nuremberg was full of the basic, technical elements of “lawyering.” Much of it was
boring and dull, and certainly unglamorous.
At the Nuremberg Taylor describes, lawyers pored over thousands of pages of
documents, searching for indicators of genocidal intent, evidence of conspiracy to make
aggressive war, and proofs of war crimes. They wrote a lot, scribbled notes in margins,
marked and revised and revised again, and passed back and forth endless internal
memoranda. The sensibility of Nuremberg was expressed in a written medium that was
neither the Charter (which established the Tribunal) nor the Judgment (which emanated
from it) but in the memorandum that took up the space between the two. Staff counsel
wrote memoranda, long and short, on every conceivable topic, from the lofty (what
would it take to prove the crime of aggressive war?) to the mundane (who should have
immediate access to translations of the trial documents?). The memorandum and the
minute define this feature of Nuremberg's sensibility.
Thus, on one level, Nuremberg was about the technical drafting of indictments,
responses, pleadings, memoranda, indices of documents, and all the rest that constitute
ordinary litigation, at least in the Anglo-American tradition. It was a real trial,
notwithstanding its many lapses of process. If all this written work did not achieve the
sheer tonnage or slowness of modern U.S. corporate litigation, it certainly exceeded that
which summary execution following a simple court-martial would have produced.
It seemed to me then, as I read The Anatomy in Iraqi Kurdistan, and it seems to me now
that for all the mystique attached to the trial process, delivery of judgment, and execution
of sentence, Nuremberg was surprisingly anticlimatic. In preparation for this Review
Essay, I watched the famous film Judgment at Nuremberg: it encapsulates the pervasive
myth that Nuremberg was dramatic and was intended to bring down upon the defendants
the awful weight and majesty of The Law, for all the world to see.
Yet the community and trial that Taylor describes are certainly not dramatic. There is no
awful weight here, obviously not in proportion *287 to the historical crimes the
defendants had committed-how could there ever hope to be?-but, more significantly,
there was no gravity beyond that of a trial for common crimes. Even the moments of
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great drama-the revelation of genocidal crimes at the death camps, the pronouncement of
sentences of death-carry with them the weight of common crime and common
punishment. Taylor's comments on the pronouncement of judgment and sentence on the
individual defendants are illustrative. The reading, he says, “of twenty-one consecutive
decisions was tiring and for the staff somewhat dull” (p. 588). If that was dull, the
preparations for those decisions by prosecution, defense, and bench were even more so,
in precisely the sense of technical tedium that I described in my account of our work in
Kurdistan. To understand the sensibility of Nuremberg, one has to explain its tedium.
Taylor goes on to describe the reactions of the individual defendants to their sentences.
Although the “[t]ension in the court was,” he says, “very high” and the spaces between
each pronouncement “seemed intolerable” (p. 598), the mood was not discernibly
different from that of any serious capital trial. This seems strange and somehow unjust.
Goering, for example, not surprised to be sentenced to death by hanging, “bowed slightly
to the Tribunal, turned, and disappeared into the elevator”; Jodl, who reportedly expected
acquittal, heard Chief Justice Lawrence sentence him to death, “stiffened visibly, turned,
and fixed his eyes on me [Taylor] for a second or two before going out” (pp. 598-99).
These descriptions remind us of what is reported in the newspapers everyday for heinous,
but nonetheless quite ordinary, crimes.
III.
Although the crimes tried at Nuremburg were historic-historically inhuman-the trial was
conducted on a distinctly mundane, human scale. The defendants themselves account for
this pervasive and almost mediocre commonness: they simply did not rise to the level of
evil corresponding to the historic nature of their crimes. Lacking the appearance of evil,
they were unable to play their parts to demonstrate the majesty of law. They were grey,
washed-out functionaries whose ultimate crime lay in saying yes to every other crime-not
at all the stuff of Milton's Satan.
Perhaps this must necessarily be so; perhaps it is simply romanticism to claim that there
could be truly great evil, evil that is embodied in the Son of the Morning, evil that is also
majestic. Even if such evil were possible, however, the men in the dock at Nuremberg did
not reflect it, and the gravity of Nuremberg was inevitably compromised by their
mediocrity. What Hannah Arendt *288 wrote of the banality of evil applies as much to
the defendants at Nuremberg as to their compatriot Eichmann. [FN5]
This limitation of Nuremberg, this reason for its commonness, is fundamentally an
aesthetic problem: it did not soar as theatre or as a spectacle of edification. There is
another reason for this commonness, however, which is rooted in a deep contradiction of
the Nuremberg trials. On one level, the crimes to be tried at Nuremberg were historic:
one desperately wants to say that they were different in kind, and not just degree, from
other serious crimes, even from murder, rape, and enslavement. For many, it was not
merely a question of numbers, of mass. Raphael Lemkin was motivated to coin the word
“genocide” in part because “he found the concept of ‘murder,’ or even ‘mass murder,’
inadequate to deal with the phenomenon he had in mind.” [FN6]
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Seen in this light, the trial halted the defendants' march to the gallows to confirm what the
victors beheld: not crimes, but crimes of history. At the same time, however, the process
of law created an air of normalcy. The defendants were executed as common criminals,
by hanging, as though to emphasize their private status. The mechanisms of an ordinary
criminal trial, with its legal memoranda, forms and pleadings, were applied by the Allies
to proclaim the defendants' crimes as common.
Taylor's account suggests that this inherent contradiction between the historic and the
common was resolved in favor of commonness. It was a debate between the rhetoric of
Nuremberg, which often (if inconsistently) emphasized the trial's historic quality, and the
technical rhetoric of law, which emphasized commonness. In the end, the law treated the
defendants as gangsters-mobsters and mafiosi-and their crimes as gangsterism on a
mammoth scale. Gangsterism is the limit of mere criminality.
Camus, otherwise so insightful into what he called Nazism's “irrational terror,” accepts
the gangster imagery. The Nazis were “psychopathic dandies” who seized hold of the
levers of the modern nation-state:
Deprived of the morality of Goethe, Germany chose, and submitted to, the
ethics of the gang.... Gangster morality is an inexhaustible round of
triumph and revenge, defeat and resentment. [FN7]
*289 Other writers on Nuremberg, too, have perpetuated the gangster image. In his
influential account Justice at Nuremberg, Robert Conot refers to the defendants in the
dock as an “array of Mafia chieftains.” [FN8]
This characterization is, however, deeply and dangerously wrong. Mein Kampf and the
writings of Alfred Rosenberg are more disturbing than the visions of Al Capone. [FN9]
Although its perpetrators were banal, the evil of Nazism had depth: the fraternal twins of
bloodsoaked, Teutonic millenarianism and the promise of modernity, as Horkheimer and
Adorno observed. [FN10] Nazism's evil coherence was not petty gangsterism.
Still, the temptation to reduce this evil to something manageable, petty in principle if not
degree-to something for a court of judges, rather than the armies of Europe and America
to handle-is wholly understandable. To make this evil petty, criminal, or crazy is to deny
that it might have triumphed. [FN11]
It is to say that the Nazis and their ilk are not really like us-which is, of course, untrue.
This reduction of history to the courtroom took place in order to make the evil of Nazism
manageable, to package it into something firmly under our control and then thrust it away
from us. Nuremberg is about spiritual control.
IV.
Nuremberg was fundamentally an expression of a peculiarly American legal sensibility,
reflecting the fact that the impetus for the trial began with the Americans, who then
7

convinced the skeptical British. The French and Soviets were brought in only later, in
order to complete “the Allies.” Indeed, the idea for a trial came mainly from a group of
New York lawyers. As Taylor says:
The initial pressure for postwar trials came from the peoples of the
German-occupied nations, but the assemblage of all these concepts in a
single trial package was the work of a handful of American lawyers, all
but [one] ... from New York City. Some of them ... were what today we
would call “moderate” Republicans; several ... were Democrats. Elitist and
generally accustomed to personal prosperity, all had strong feelings of
noblesse oblige (p. 41).
*290 Taylor himself knew a number of prosecution staff members from his earlier years
in government. He shared a lot in common with them, and they shared a lot in common
with each other. Once in Nuremberg, stuck with one another for months at a time, they
became a remarkably homogenous group, the distilled essence of the antiquated ideal of
the lawyer-statesman. It was as if Sullivan & Cromwell or Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy decided to conduct a trial. The aura of the prevailing New York corporate law
firm culture drifted across the Atlantic to land in Nuremberg.
Taylor shows that American legalist sensibilities, which, in a time of best-sellers like The
Firm and television shows like L.A. Law, seem so contemporary, are, in fact, deeply
rooted. Deepest of all is the belief that the courtroom is the right place for dealing with
war crimes. The American lawyers viewed the war effort and the war itself as properly
bringing the rule of law to bear on an ever-widening range of human conduct, subjecting
mere politics to it. The war, in their minds, transcended the merely political: it was for
them a statement of law, but one that still needed, in the end, the imprimatur of a judicial
act. The Nuremberg trial was needed to convert the contingent fact of Allied might into
the eternal fact of Allied right.
These sentiments reflect that peculiarly American view that the world can be reimagined
and reinvented through the rule of law in the courtroom. The architects of Nuremberg
thought a judicial trial would limit the otherwise rampant scope of political action; it
would sink Russian proposals to ship millions of men from Germany as slave labor to
rebuild the Soviet Union (pp. 45-46). In another sense, however, the very idea of a trial
was an expansive imaginative exercise: how the world might have been, how it should
have been. Yet, as everyone knew, after the war and its devastation, and especially after
the Holocaust, there was no going back. Nothing could ever make up the loss.
Nonetheless, Nuremberg was a trial in which the future was at issue. Germany was
destroyed and occupied and its dethroned leaders were in the dock. The trial would make
a difference, and not only to these defendants; it would be part of a larger process to
recast Germany in a different mold. The future required a certain kind of Nuremberg
spectacle-a spectacle, curiously and almost contradictorily, of deflation, in which the
Nazi leaders were seen as perpetrators of merely common crimes, criminals brought to
heel. This is how the trial's American framers saw it, and they were not wrong.
8

V.
It may seem strange that I have taken for my materials such airy stuff as the affect and
tone of the trial and the reductive tendency of *291 the law, rather than legal doctrine and
hard political reality. But fragility does not signify unimportance, and The Anatomy
offers one of the few opportunities to hold these things delicately in our hands and to
discern their faint and tentative patterns.
What we learn, I think, is that the recourse to a trial and judicial procedures did not
heighten the affective impact of the Allied victory. In fact, Nuremberg deliberately
dampened it. The trial reduced the awe and awfulness of the Allies' complete dominion
over Germany as it reduced the former masters of Germany to criminals. It peculiarly dedramatized history by placing it in the same forum where one might seek replevin of a
cow.
This observation has consequences for the Yugoslavia tribunal. Before turning to
compare the sensibility of Nuremberg with its Yugoslavia counterpart, it is instructive to
note how much of Nuremberg's spirit is absent from the charter of the new tribunal.
[FN12] As we have seen, the great conceit of Nuremberg was that it reduced the
landscape of war to the dimensions of a courtroom. Indeed, as Taylor makes clear,
Jackson aimed to establish a judicial precedent on the criminality of aggressive war.
Jackson “made crimes against peace-the criminalization of initiating aggressive war-the
foremost feature of the Nuremberg trial....” (p. 635). He saw the fundamental crime as a
crime against peace, the crowning, pathbreaking charge that the Americans and British
divided between them. For Jackson, war crimes were minor matters to be left to the
French and Soviet prosecutors.
As today's Security Council establishes the Yugoslavia tribunal, Nuremberg remains
relevant principally for matters of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide-the
“minor” matters at Nuremberg. Jackson's aspiration for Nuremberg has faltered precisely
on account of the existence of the Security Council. To be sure, Nuremberg did establish
a rule of law concerning aggressive war; it is codified in the United Nations Charter. In
that sense, at least, war is no longer merely the foreign policy option of an independent
sovereign. The rule of law has replaced political decision. However, this rule of law is not
justiciable; it is not, as at Nuremberg, a matter of judicial determination. Instead, the
determination of aggressive war and threats to peace and security is committed to the
hands of the Security Council itself. Great power politics is now dressed up in the
rhetoric of the rule of law and sanctified by the U.N. Charter.
The Yugoslavia tribunal's charter, therefore, is noteworthy for what it does not reproduce
from the vastly more sweeping Nuremberg *292 charter. The division between jus ad
bellum [FN13] and jus in bello [FN14] is fully restored in the Yugoslavia tribunal
charter, with the Security Council having sole discretion as to the former, and the tribunal
adjudicating only the latter. Even within the area of war crimes, the Yugoslavia tribunal
has no power to impose the death sentence. The most controversial features of the
9

American prosecution at Nuremberg, the conspiracy charges, have been eviscerated, and
guilt by association has been ruled out absolutely. Finally, no trials may be held in
absentia. To my mind, these are all sensible constraints, but they do reflect a narrower
conception than Nuremberg.
Of course, the Yugoslavia tribunal's authority is limited by a more practical matter: it has
no one to try. Still, my own experience-private conversations with senior military officers
and judge advocates of the NATO armies over the past two years-suggests that this
tribunal has more than just practical difficulties: there is a deep malaise. Senior European
military officers and diplomats have told me that they see no point in scheduling a trial if
no one is willing to commit to a military victory. Paradoxically, this sentiment comes
from officers who deeply oppose military involvement in the former Yugoslavia. They
have brother officers who disingenuously hope that the Americans will “exhaust
themselves,” as one put it, “in fantasizing about a trial and its paperwork,” so that they
will not seriously consider an invasion.
What is striking about these attitudes is that they assume precisely what the Americans
have not. Many of these officers argue that there is no justice but “victor's justice.” As
another officer explained, Nuremberg was a “lovely hood ornament on the ungainly
vehicle that liberated Western Europe, but it was not a substitute for D-day.” A military
victory is not simply a practical prerequisite to a trial, they seem to say, but a moral
necessity.
This assertion captures my own point about the sensibility of Nuremberg: to reduce the
world to a courtroom, to legal memoranda and pleadings and paperwork, is possible only
once an army sits atop its vanquished enemy. Otherwise, the enormity of the crimes left
unaddressed out in the hills of Bosnia so dwarf those raised before the tribunal that it
mocks justice. A trial, Nuremberg taught, puts the symbolic seal of justice on what
armies have rectified with force. These officers imply that to hold a trial without having
“fixed things” in the field is, symbolically, as much or more an act of ratification as
condemnation.
*293 In other words, to hold a war crimes trial in the former Yugoslavia today would be
like holding Nuremberg after acquiescing in the German annexation of Poland, the
Ukraine, and the rest of the eastern lands.
VI.
These officers lay a serious moral charge against this new tribunal. I am not sure that
there is an answer to it, except to say that the issue of war crimes is legally and morally
separate from the resort to force. Jus in bello and jus ad bellum are legally and logically
independent. Because the two do not overlap, one can argue that a conviction of
individuals for war crimes by an international tribunal at the present time would condemn
but not ratify the suffering in Bosnia.
Unfortunately, one can reply, they do overlap, because what NATO would have to “fix”
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in the former Yugoslavia is not only conquest and illegal resort to force but also war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes of conduct. Seen in that light, a tribunal is not above
the question of military intervention; the one presumes the other. Whereas too many
world leaders, including some in the U.S. government, welcome the proposal for a trial
because they see it as essentially a symbolic alternative to military action, they cynically
understand very well how the two are linked, but linked as a reason for military inaction.
While this profound lack of correspondence between the Nuremberg and Yugoslavia
tribunals arises from the obvious difference between surrendered Germany and
unsurrendered Serbia, it also expresses the difference between the sensibilities of the
Nuremberg and the Yugoslavia tribunals. As Taylor describes it, the Nuremberg trial
could afford to be an exercise in emotional deflation precisely because the Allies had paid
the price in blood to occupy Germany. In effect, Nuremberg was always just the coda to
that military affair.
The Yugoslavia tribunal is not, in contrast, the coda at this point, but the main and only
act. Those who promote the trial see it as a way of pumping up emotion and affect over
Yugoslavia; they see it as a way to bring the awful weight and majesty of The Law down
upon-well, whom? The Yugoslavia tribunal invokes the law as a rhetorical device to
make the U.N. appear to do more than it has, but everyone knows that those who would
conduct the trial have not paid the price.
Thus, in the end, those who want to imitate Nuremberg in Yugoslavia have deeply
mistaken what the Nuremberg trial was all about. At its core Nuremberg was about
foregoing what was in one's hand; this Yugoslavia tribunal wants to grasp what the world
has not been willing to put there. This is why public discussion of the tribunal has *294
an emotionally desperate quality. This desperate quality corresponds precisely but
inversely to the tedium and plodding pace of Nuremberg. After the war, after the battles,
after the ethnic cleansing had ended, Nuremberg could afford to be tedious and plodding.
The Yugoslavia tribunal seeks to make history; but the true lesson of Nuremberg is that
the power of law to reduce history to its terms can only be accomplished where historyvictory and surrender-has been made elsewhere.
END TEXT
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